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Abstract. Ciphers have their strength from the mathematical functions of 
confusion and diffusion, also known as substitution and permutation. These 
were the basics of classical cryptography and they are still the basic part of 
modern ciphers. In block ciphers, diffusion is achieved by the use of maximum 
distance separable (MDS) matrices. In this paper, we present some methods for 
constructing dynamic (and random) non-linear MDS matrices.  
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1 Introduction 
As defined by Claude Shannon in his paper "Communication Theory of Secrecy 
Communication", confusion and diffusion are two properties necessitated for the 
operation of any secure cryptographic algorithm [1]. In the classic ciphers these 
attributes were achieved by the use of substitution or transposition ciphers. Modern 
cryptography utilizes the same phenomenon in the form of substitution-permutation 
network (SPN). Feistel networks employing S-box provide the same effect but at 
much higher cost in terms of execution units [2][3].  
Diffusion in SPN is due to the practice of permutation boxes which dissipate the 
statistical structure of the plaintext in the long range statistics of the ciphertext. 
Maximum distance separable (MDS) matrices, which are mainly derived from Reed-
Solomon codes, deliver the diffusion properties thus making them one of the vital 
constituent of modern age ciphers like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and 
Two Fish. 
Serge Vaudenay proposed MDS matrices (linear multipermutations) as a cipher 
design element [5]. Some of the famous ciphers that make use of MDS matrices are 
AES [6], Two Fish [7], Shark and Square. AES and Two Fish use predefined 4×4 
MDS matrices (in field  for computations) for rendering diffusion to the resulting 
cipher text. Other ciphers utilizing these matrices are Manta, Hierocrypt, and 
Camellia, and the stream cipher MUGI and the cryptographic hash function 
WHIRLPOOL.  
 
 
2 Dynamic MDS Matrices 
Nearly all the ciphers which incorporate MDS matrices as their mathematical 
structure for diffusion use predefined MDS matrices. Although in some ciphers the 
possibility of random selection of MDS matrix with some constraint is provided, but 
this idea is not being exercised in practical applications.  
2.1 Dynamic MDS Matrix from Random Constant 
A method for generating MDS matrix is proposed in [8]. Already available MDS 
matrix can be used to reconstruct new nonlinear random matrix. 
Theorem: 
Let  = [ai,j]mxm , ai,j  Fq be an MDS matrix. Then for an element     Fq, e 
is an MDS matrix.  
Proof: 
We will use the property of non-singularity of sub matrices of	. Let  be an MDS 
matrix for any square sub-matrix 
 of	 From the property of MDS matrices, every 
sub matrix should be non-singular 
   . This theorem can be proved by 
contradiction. We now generate a new matrix   such that   , where     Fq. 
The new square sub matrix will be    , for all sub matrices   of  . 
Suppose that	
  , which implies	
  , or 
  . Thus, 
  			   
which contradicts the assumption that  is non-singular. This proves that  is an MDS 
matrix. 
This method can introduce nonlinearity in MDS but at a higher cost for the field . There are a number of multiplications involved (modular multiplication at each 
step), 256 lookup tables are required. The results can be pre-computed and saved in 
stack for immediate usage. Before discussing implementations and effectuations of 
this method, we will discuss and manipulate another method for yielding random and 
dynamic MDS matrices. 
2.2 Dynamic MDS Matrix from Optimal Matrix 
Junod and Vaudenay proposed efficient MDS matrices by maximizing the number of 
1’s and minimizing different constants in the matrix [9]. Multiplications by 1 are 
“free” operations so they can improve the computational efficiency of MDS matrices. 
MDS matrices need to be bi-regular arrays. A 2×2 array with entries in the field is bi-
regular if at least one row and one column of the matrix have two different entries.  
Example of an “optimal” bi-regular 4×4 -matrix is 
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            . 
The optimal matrix consists of many 1’s and a few distinct constants (a, b and c). It is 
obvious that multiplying with this method will yield efficient results because of many 
transparent multiplications with 1’s.  
For generating new and efficient MDS matrices from the already given matrix, 
maintaining quite a large number of 1’s is required. Let  be the 4×4 optimal matrix 
as given in the above example. For assuring presence of 1’s in the matrix even after 
multiplication by a random constant	, we have to convert any constant in the bi-
regular array to 1. It can be done simply by choosing inverse of any constant other 
than 1 and multiply the given matrix with the calculated inverse. Modular inverse of 
the constant can be found by     ! " 	#$%	&. 
The modular multiplicative inverse of modulo 	&  can be found with the extended 
Euclidean algorithm. The algorithm finds solutions to Bézout's identity ' ( )  *+	,- . 
where a, b are given and x, y, and gcd(a, b) are the integers that the algorithm 
discovers. This algorithm runs in time O(log(m)2), assuming |a|<m, and is generally 
more efficient than exponentiation. 
 The new form of the generated MDS matrix in   will be  
	 !       !  !  ! !  !  !  !   !  ! !  !   !  
All occurrences of constant  will convert to 1 which provides the advantage of 
effective and cheap computation. Moreover the inherited vantages of “free” 
multiplications also have the positive aspect on the computation efficiency for 
generation of random MDS matrix. On the other hand, there is a drawback associated 
with this technique. In [9], it has been showed that the numbers of 1’s that can occur 
in optimal (and partially-optimal) matrices are more than the number of different 
constants. Considering this fact, it seems that we may not be able to sustain the 
maximum number of 1’s, which is a requirement for efficiency.  
3 Implementation Considerations and Conditions 
This section presents implementation circumstances for constructing dynamic MDS 
matrices from any given MDS matrix. Two methods are provided in the previous 
 
 
portion of the paper. For practical implementation of these techniques, the most 
important consideration is the type of matrix which is already present. Type of matrix 
defines expenditures in computation, time, and power.  
3.1 Considerations for Different Types of Matrices 
For this subsection we consider circulant, non-circulant, optimal, non-optimal, and 
“worst-case” type matrices for returning dynamic matrices. 
AES uses 4×4 circulant matrix [6] whereas Two Fish uses a 4×4 non-circulant matrix 
[7]. Circulant matrix is a special kind of Toeplitz matrix where each row vector is 
rotated one element to the right relative to the preceding row vector. In non-circulant 
matrix, the elements of row vector are repeated but they may not follow any specific 
arrangements.  
We will use the method given in Section 2.1 for generation of dynamic MDS 
matrix. In this method a randomly selected number e is multiplied with the given 
matrix. For circular matrices the benefit of repeated constants is present and we can 
harness this by computing the modular multiplications of the matrix with the random 
constant, storing it in stack and assigning the memory address to a pointer. For these 
repeated constants in circulant matrix, we can simply use the pre-computed values 
instead of doing all the multiplications over and again. The same holds for given non-
circulant matrices. Dimension and number of elements in matrices are known and 
elements are modular multiplied by values of random constant ranging from ‘01’ to 
any number defined within	.  
For optimal matrix, many multiplications are saved because of free multiplication 
of the random constant with 1’s.  Now we consider the cases of non-optimal matrix 
and so-called worst-case matrix (with all distinct constants). For optimal matrices, 
requirement for computation is more than optimal matrices because of lesser 1’s and 
more distinct constants. As these constants are being used in all the row vectors, they 
play role in saving computations and memory. For matrix with all different constants, 
the demand for computation and memory is at maximum.  
4 Performance Analysis 
These methods for random MDS matrix generation are implemented on C54xx family 
series by Texas Instruments. TMS320VC5416 fixed-point digital signal processor is 
used for this purpose. It is a 16-bit processor with operations at 160 MHz. It 
incorporates 128K × 16-bit on-chip RAM and 16K × 16-bit on-chip ROM which is 
configured for program memory [10].  
For the method involving multiplicative inverses, before modular multiplication 
with elements of the existing matrix, the inverses are to be taken. This causes a 
drawback for efficient usage of this technique. Because of its efficiency in terms of 
computation, we have implemented method given in Section 2.1. Following table 
shows the computational requirements for generation of non-linear dynamic MDS 
matrices. All values are taken for a given 4×4 matrix. 
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Table 1. Performance analysis of different matrices.  
Type of matrix CPU cycles Time Memory 
requirement 
Optimal 2,077,750 13 ms 762 bytes 
Circulant 2,723,924 17 ms 1016 bytes 
Non-circulant 2,723,924 17 ms 1016 bytes 
Non-optimal 3,394,206 21 ms 1016 bytes 
Worst case 4,467,946 28 ms 5588 bytes 
 
Results show that the optimal matrices are more feasible for formation of new 
random matrices. 
5 Applications 
Dynamic MDS matrices can be incorporated in block ciphers to ensure security of 
encryption and decryption. For different communication sessions different random 
matrices can be utilized. As all the multiplications will be pre-computed so the only 
random constant is to be chosen. These random constants can be communicated 
between two parties in a number of ways. If the parties are performing mutual 
authentication [11], they can share the random constants embedded in their respective 
digital signatures. Similarly random constants can be treated as message for Standard 
Hash Algorithm (SHA) function and this hashed value can be exchanged. 
After introduction of dynamic MDS matrices, diffusion in the block ciphers will 
become unpredictable thus enabling strength in the security of the cipher.  
6 Security Analysis 
In this section, immunity of the dynamic MDS matrices against some of the well 
known cryptographic attacks will be discussed.     
MDS matrices are separable and invertible, which causes their computation to be 
difficult. Their non-linearity makes them resilient against algebraic attacks. Linear 
cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack that requires access to large amounts of 
plaintext and ciphertext pairs encrypted with an unknown key. Differential 
cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext attack that seeks to discover a relationship between 
cipher texts produced by two related plaintexts. It focuses on statistical analysis of 
two inputs and two outputs of a cryptographic algorithm.  
Diffusion caused by the multipermutations (MDS matrices) is non-linear and more 
difficult to predict because of the usage of random value to generate random MDS 
matrix. These matrices can be generated dynamically in every round thus causing the 
prediction of statistical properties and relationships between plain and cipher texts 
more difficult. Thus linear and differential cryptanalysis can be averted by dynamic 
generation of MDS matrices. 
 
 
Side channel attacks (timing attack, power analysis, etc) work by acquiring 
information from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem. These attacks rely 
on either emitted electromagnetic radiation or on relationship information (timing and 
power attacks) [12]. The efficient MDS matrix implementation by Junod and 
Vaudenay works by maximizing the number of 1’s in the matrix. Power used by the 
operations involving 1’s can be used for differential power attacks and thus we need 
to distribute the Hamming weight to avoid this attack. The methods for making 
matrices in this paper are more immune towards these attacks because of no 
dependence on 1’s (1st method) and lesser number of 1’s (2nd method). 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented two methods for generating dynamic non-linear MDS 
matrices. These matrices can be efficiently employed in any of the present block 
ciphers. These matrices distribute the statistical properties of the plaintext in an 
unpredictable manner over the cipher text. That’s way the cipher becomes immune 
towards many attacks. These methods can be used with little and no change in the 
present ciphers. Extra computation is, however, needed for their implementation but 
there is a benefit of high security associated with this.   
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